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Abstract 
Life in a refugee camp often briygs about 
the need for explanations among its in- 
habitants, and historical narrdtives at- 
tempt to supply the answers. But these 
narratives change over time and several 
narratives can exist in the same refugee 
camp simul taneously. This paperargues 
that the production of historicpl narra- 
tives is closely related to the dominant 
political ideologies in the cambs. It ar- 
gues that in order to undersltand the 
changes in represen tations oft& past in 
the camps, one mus t analyze the changes 
in political movements amongitheHutu 
opposition. It shows how the dominant 
discourse on ethnicity in Burundi has 
changed since the early 1980s and how 
this has forced the Hutu upppsition to 
reformulateitsdemands. Finally, it con- 
tends that regional develupmmts, such 
as the genocide in Rwanda, have also 
been influential in thegeneral shiftfrom 
an essentialist to a pluralist discourse 
among Burundian Hu tu in exile. It con- 
cludes that ideological formations 
among refugees in camps are in no ways 
isolated@ the outside world. 
La vie dans un camp de r+& crte sou- 
m t  des conditions qui amhen t ses habi- 
tants d recourir h l'explication, et les 
narrations historiques tendeiat a fournir 
les t l h t s  explicatifi recherchks. Mais 
ces narrations changent avec le temps et 
plusieurs dispositifs narratifi peuvent 
exis ter d a m  les mike camps de r+gits 
s i m u l t a ~ t .  Cetarticlep&ente une 
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argumentation selon laquelle la produc- 
tion denarrations historiques est ttroite- 
ment relite d l'idtologie politique 
dominante dans le camps. On soutient 
quepour comprendre les changemen ts de 
reprdsentations de la viepasdsdu camps, 
on doit analyser les changements inht- 
rents au mouvemen t politique de l'oppo- 
sition Outoue. On montrealors combien 
le discours dominant sur l'ethnicitt au 
Burundi a changt depuis le ddbut des 
anne'es 1980, e t comment cephinomh a 
forct l'opposition Outoue d reformuler 
ses demandes. Finalement on avance que 
les de'veloppements dans la rtgion, 
comme par exemple le ghocide man- 
dais, ont eu aussi uneforte influencedam 
le mouvement ghe'ral de passage d'un 
discours essentialiste h un discours plu- 
ralis te parmi les Outous burundiens en 
exil. L'articleconclut que les forma tions 
idtologiques se dheloppant entre r+- 
gits d a m  les camps ne son t en rim isoltes 
du mondeextkrieur. 
Introduction 
This paper examines the relations be- 
tween the production of historical nar- 
ratives and political movements in 
refugee camps. After finding that com- 
peting versions of Burundi's past exist 
among Hutu refugees in camps in Tan- 
zania and that these versions of history 
have evolved over the years, this paper 
contends that these narratives do not 
merely "emerge" as a result of objective 
life conditions in the camps-although 
these conditions can be more or less 
conducive to their survival. Rather, rep- 
resentations of the past make up part of 
larger ideological constructs that are 
linked to the main political movements 
in the camps. Thus in order to under- 
stand the production of historical nar- 
ratives we must analyze the wider 
political framework that refugees are 
part of. This frameworkextends far be- 
yond the confined space of the refugee 
camp; involving national, regional and 
global changes in the political field.' 
Two Narratives 
We are sitting on narrow wooden 
benches in a neat hut made of UNHCR 
plastic sheeting-the white and blue 
material that dominates the landscape 
inLukole refugee camp and much of the 
surrounding Tanzanian villages. We 
are in "La Vedette," one of the more ex- 
pensive restaurants that have shot up in 
the camp. Here, the elite enjoy brochettes, 
Pepsi and Primus-beer smuggled in 
from Burundi. Opposite me a young 
man with enthusiastic pale brown eyes 
is explaining to me the intricate details 
of mwamiship and Tutsi trickery and 
dominance in pre-colonial Burundi. He 
explains about all the different dynas- 
ties and lists their names. He tells me 
how the Tutsifirst came to Burundi from 
theNorth with their cattle, and how they 
cunningly lured the Hutu into bondage 
through lending them calves or playing 
on the superstitious nature of the Hutu. 
He explains how the Tutsi are not 
honest and hard working like the Hutu. 
Their success has been achieved 
through cunningness, lies, and secrecy. 
If they were not so secretive, the Hutu 
would discover their falseness and that 
wouldbe theendof Tutsipower. That is 
why the Tutsi do everything that stands 
in their might to prevent Hutu frombe- 
ing educated and discovering the 
"Tutsi secret." You cannot trust a Tutsi 
and therefore they are not allowed to 
joinhis party, Palipehutu (Partipour la 
Liberation de Peuple Hutu). 
Some of the stories he tells me with 
passion and oratorical eloquence-in 
spite of his having onlyprimaryeduca- 
tion, and in spite of (or perhaps because 
of) being born in exile-and they are 
quite fascinating as stories. 
In the old days they would choose the 
most beautiful young Hutu men and 
women. They would go to the fami- 
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lies and say "this one is beautiful and 
strong-this one also.' Then they 
would lay them down like this-in 
rows on the ground--on the path. 
This was at certain celebrations for 
theMwami [king]. Then the royal cat- 
tle would walk along them-on their 
backs, like that, over their bodies- 
down to the watering hole . . . (Young 
man, Lukole, September 1997). 
The next day I am sitting the same 
place, interviewing a group of men- 
young and old-who all hold some 
positior, of importance in the camp. One 
is a head teacher, another works for an 
NGO, one used to be an officer in the 
army, another a burgomaster. The rea- 
son, they are here, is that they are the 
leading figures in Palipehutu's rival 
party in the camp; the CNDD (Conseil 
National pour la Defense de la 
Bmocratie). With the memory of the 
stories from the previous day in mind, I 
try to ask them about Burundi's past, 
and being educated and interested in 
politics and the affairs of their country, 
they answer. But there is no doubt that 
the enthusiasm for ancient his tory isnot 
overwhelming. They manage to present 
the various dynasties of Burundi but 
they do not spill over with detailed ac- 
counts of royal cattle walking on young 
Hutu or royal drums made of the skins 
of Hutu testicles. For them pre-colonial 
history has only academic interest. 
They believe the conflict between Hutu 
and Tutsi only started after colonialism. 
It was the Belgians who, through a 
policy of divide and rule, created the 
tensions between Hutu and Tutsi. 
Constructing Histories in Exile 
These two narratives illustrate to us 
how differently the past can be repre- 
sented. One believes the ethnic conflict 
to be age old and between two essen- 
tially different races, while the other 
believes the conflict to be the result of 
colonial policies and the categories tobe 
constructed to some degree. While the 
young Palipehutu man is obsessed with 
ancient history and presents a very co- 
herent nationalhistory, the CNDD sup- 
porters are more interested in recent 
history and often contradict themselves. 
Before looking at the concrete con- 
struction of the past in Lukole, some 
theoretical clarifications on the rela- 
tions between history, ideology and 
political movements are needed. His- 
tory and its representations in e x i l m r  
anywhere for that sake--arenot merely 
a question of recounting facts from the 
past. Especially when we consider the 
history of nations we are dealing with 
constructs; constructs that are creating 
a nation and a national history retro- 
spectively. As Balibar writes, 
The history of nations, beginning 
with our own, is always already pre- 
sented to us in the form of a narrative 
which attributes to these entities the 
continuity of a subject. (Balibar 1991, 
86) 
The nation as a continuity is a two- 
fold illusion. It is the illusion that gen- 
erations have handed down an 
unchanged "substance" over thecentu- 
ries. And it is the illusion that the contin- 
gency of events that makeuphistory are 
not contingent at all; there could only 
have been this one chain of events. It is 
the illusion of a national destiny 
(Balibar 1991,8647). 
The right to tell this national history 
is a highly contested domain in 
Burundi. All parties to the conflict are 
eager to tell "the truth" about what actu- 
ally has happened and is happening in 
their country. Everyone believes he2 
possesses the "substance" of the na- 
tional heritage. In the camp, people of- 
ten wanted me to take their story to "the 
important people of the UN and your 
country" so that the "reality" could get 
out. All Hutu refugees agree that the 
Tutsi are secretive and stick to power 
through "hiding the truth." If only this 
"truth" could get out and the Tutsi se- 
cretsbe exposed,they argue, the outside 
world (especially America) would help 
solve the ~onflict.~ These views are all 
permeated by the illusion of a national 
destiny. 
Liisa Malkki (1995), in Purity and Ex- 
ile: Violence, Memoy and National Cos- 
mologyamong Hutu Refugees in Tanzania, 
provides a brilliant analysis of histori- 
cal narratives in exile. Like the young 
Palipehutu supporter, mentioned 
above, the Burundian refugees in 
refugee camp were very pre- 
occupiekl with their past. 
In virdually all aspects of contempo- 
rary social life in the Mishamo camp, 
the H@tu refugees made reference to 
a shaned body of knowledge about 
their past in Burundi. Everyday 
events, processes and relations in the 
camp were spontaneously and con- 
sistently interpreted and acted upon 
by evoking this collective past as a 
charter and blueprint. (ibid., 53) 
However, as Balibar points out such 
histories are not merely descriptions of 
the past. They are ameans tobetter un- 
derstand the present. 
It [theHutu history] represented, not 
only a description of the past, nor 
even merely an evaluation of the 
past, but a subversive recasting and 
reinterpretation of it in fundamen- 
tally moral terms. In this sense it can- 
not be accurately described as either 
history or myth. It was what can be 
called a mythico-history. (ibid., 54, 
original emphasis.) 
How much mythico-histories are fact or 
fiction, how much they tell the "true" 
history of Burundi, is irrelevant, Malkki 
argues. 
But what made the refugees' narra- 
tive mMical, in the anthropological 
sense, was not its truth or falsity, but 
the fad that it was concerned with 
order in a fundamental, cosmological 
sense. (ibid., 55) 
Malkkl's work shows how refugees, 
whose world has crumbled, following 
massacres of horrific proportions and 
brutality and exile to a very different 
environment, are very much in need of 
new explmations as to why they are 
where they are. She also shows how self 
settled town refugees do not appear to 
have the same urge to create new na- 
tional histories. 
But whereas mythico-histories seem to 
simply "emerge" in her analysis, I be- 
lieve that these histories are actively 
used and manipulated for political 
means. As we saw in the two interviews, 
two very different versions of national 
history cm exist in the same refugee 
camp. In other words, the versions of 
what happened in Burundi as told to 
Malkki in Mishamo and to me in Lukole 
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make up part of larger poqtical dis- 
courses and have been sanctioned by 
the political leaders in the camps or else- 
where. 
The question of whether mythologies 
and ideologies merely emeqge on the 
basis of structuralconditionq in society 
' or can be manipulated by p~litical ac- 
tors, has always been a point of debate 
for political scienti~ts.~ In wbat he calls 
"the Dialectic of 'Avai2ability1and 'Struc- 
tured Contingencies' (Hanseq 1997,119) 
Thomas Hansen argues that 
The success or failure of political 
movements and parties is, thus, 
heavily conditioned by the $tructure. 
of 'availabilityt-i.e., a certajnlevelof 
disgruntlement, a sense of violation 
of rights and readiness to protest in 
an electorate or populatibn-that 
provides necessary but far from suf- 
ficient, conditions of possibility for 
political mass-mobilization . . . Fur- 
ther, the success or failure of 8 political 
actor depends on the attrxtiveness 
of the interests it claims to kepresent 
. . . (ibid., 164) 
Thus the contents of the mythico-his- 
tories, the rumours, and thq nationalist 
and political ideologies that circulate in 
the camp cannot be deduced from the 
objective interests nor the objective life 
conditions of the refugees alone. One 
cannot a priori determine wpch ideolo- 
gies will emerge. But for iqleologies to 
gain some ground-to find resonance 
among the refugees-they must appeal 
to the refugees. They must offer an ex- 
planation as to why they are in a refugee 
camp and offer themselves as the solu- 
tion to all their troubles pnd tribula- 
tions.5 
Furthermore, as much gs these ide- 
ologies promise to fulfil a need in the 
camps, they might have their origins 
elsewhere. If politicalmovements are to 
have any success and credibility, they 
must alsobe able to relate to the political 
playing field in the country of origin as 
well as globally. Thus, in ouder tounder- 
stand the dynamics of political ideolo- 
gies in the refugee camps one has to 
expand one's analysis to political dy- 
namics far beyond the camp. 
As Marc Sommers (1995) points out, 
the educated, male Hutu elite in exile 
claims to represent all Bufvndian refu- 
gees, often playing the ethnic card in 
order to further its own political inter- 
ests, without really caring about the 
watu wadogo (small people). There is no 
doubt that Burundi society is deeply 
hierarchic! and I would often hear com- 
ments about "big men" as opposed to 
the "peasants" in the camp. But the fact 
that refugee society is hierarchic and 
that certain "big men" get to represent 
the refugees as suchdoes not automati- 
cally entail that this is a "wrong" or 
"false" representation. As mentioned 
above, the ideologies of the elite have to 
"appeal" to the "small people" to gain 
support, no matter whether they actu- 
ally represent their objective interests.' 
There might well be counter dis- 
courses among the women and the poor 
in the camps that I have not encoun- 
tered. As Sommers also remarks, "For 
most Bumdi refugees, public silence is 
the safest strategy for survival" (ibid., 
23). I also found that non-elite refu- 
gees-especially women-were not 
very comfortable with expressing their 
opinions to me in public. However, in 
life history interviews with young,non- 
elite men, they would usually open up. 
And usually they would express opin- 
ions about Burundi history that corre- 
sponded with either Palipehutu's or 
O D ' s  versions. As we will see later in 
this paper, the most obvious diversion 
or resistance to elite politics is ex- 
pressed by businessmen in the camps 
who prefer to concentrate on the present 
in the camp rather than on the past and 
future in Burundi. It is difficult to esti- 
mate how much these political ideolo- 
gies represent the "small people" but it 
is certain that they are the dominant 
ideologies in the camp and that they are 
very important for understanding how 
refugees understand their past. 
In conclusion, we may claim that rep- 
resentations of the past make up part of 
political ideologies in refugee camps, 
and for these ideologies to have any 
thrust among refugees they must appeal 
to the refugees and offer themselves as 
the solution to all their problems. They 
do not necessarily reflect what an out- 
sider would consider the objective inter- 
estsof the "smallpeople",but this does 
not disqualify them as powerful ideolo- 
gies, that can mobilize and be internal- 
ized by the "small people." 
These political ideologies do not only 
relate to the problems of the refugees. 
They also have to respond to and adapt 
to changing political agendas in 
Burundi. In order to understand the 
concrete changes in ideologies and con- 
structions of the past inLukole, we must 
analyze the contexts in which the vari- 
ous political movements were created 
and evolved. 
The 1972 Massacres: 
An Eye-opener 
In 1972, an estimated 100,000 Hutu 
were killed by the Burundi army 
(Lemarchand 1989, 22), and it is esti- 
mated that some 150,000 Hutu fled the 
country and settled in refugee camps in 
Tanzania (Lemarchand 1996, 104). In 
1972 all ethnicity was denied discur- 
sive existence by the Tutsi dominated 
Burundian government. The official 
discourse held that the terms Hutu and 
Tutsi were "false" colonial tags that had 
been put on Burundians by the Belgians 
in order to divide and rule. With inde- 
pendence, they argued, the false divi- 
sions of the Burundi people had seized 
to exist, and should therefore not be 
mentioned. Those who mentioned eth- 
nicity were not only guilty of tribalism 
and of splitting the nation, they were 
also traitors to the nation, since unity 
was a defining element of the nation it- 
self. 
Even among the opposition in 
Burundi ethnicity was hardly an issue 
prior to 1972. But the massacres in 1972 
functioned as an eye-opener to the sur- 
viving Hutu, especially those in exile. 
Many refugees related to Malkki how 
they had started to talk to other refugees 
in Tanzania and in this way had 
learned about the extent and scale of the 
massacres. "We realized that we were 
all here for one reason: because we are of 
theHutugroupM (Malkki 1995,11l).The 
refugees from l972had very little educa- 
tion and had not previously beenpoliti- 
cally organized. In fact, they had hardly 
even thought of themselves as Hutu. 
Experiencing the extreme cruelty of the 
massacres and later living in an isolated 
camp, created the need for explanations; 
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explanations that they did not have 
ready made before they fled. Their expe 
rience of one cosmology cracking and 
the need to create anew must have been 
acute. This was the perfect place for radi- 
cal political parties like Palipehutu to 
start "awakening the masses." 
Palipehutu was created in Mishamo 
in April 1980. It conducted an "aware- 
ness campaign" first in refugee camps 
in Tanzania and Rwanda, later inside 
Burundi itself. It is said that Remy 
Gahutu, founder of Palipehutu, pur- 
posefully chose Mishamo as the place to 
start "educating the people" because 
Mishamo was in the middle of virgin 
forest, and people did not have much 
contact with the outside world. 
Ulyankulu, on the other hand, was 
placed next to a railway line, and its 
inhabitants were much to busy trading 
to be bothered with politics and their 
national h i s t~ry .~  The ideology that he 
brought gave them all the answers to 
their questions. It offered an answer to 
their questions of why they were there. 
With the lack of other explanations and 
solutions, Palipehutu's ideology soon 
became hegemonic and its version of 
history the official and only legitimate 
one. Remy Gahutu declares in the Pref- 
ace to his book "Persecution of the Hutu of 
Burundi": 
We urgently demand that the Hutus 
of Burundi who read this book teach 
their children the exact truth about 
their subjugation. The goal of this 
document is to remove the misun- 
derstandings and falsifications of 
Burundian history that have been 
encouraged by certain corrupt mem- 
bers of the blood-soaked Tutsi re- 
gime . . . (Gahutu, no date, 1). 
So, as much as we may envisage that 
myhco-histories merely "emerge" and 
become standardized and authorized 
versions of specific events, we must also 
be aware of the political power struc- 
tures in the camp at their time of produc- 
t i ~ n . ~  
The discursive elements of Pali- 
pehutu's discourse were created in op- 
position to the dominant discourse in 
Burundi at the time. Therefore, its pri- 
mary goal was to prove that Burundi 
was indeed inhabited by several ethnic 
groups. Once it had been established 
that such ethnic groups exist-and 
have existed since time immemorial-it 
could also argue that the Hutu were 
essentially exploited. 
In the above mentioned--almost pro- 
grammatic-document by Remy 
Gahutu, key words are liberation, peo- 
ple's party, unity, awaken the Hutu con- 
sciousness, and the like. Many of these 
remind of socialist jargon of the 
Fanonist brand: It is thenoble duty of the 
avant garde to educate the masses and 
make them aware of their oppression. In 
a chapter named "What can be done to 
save the Hutu" the various subtitles, 
givingus the answer, are as follows: "A. 
The Hutu Must Become Aware of the 
Causes of Their Suffering, B. Hutu 
Unity, C. The Foundation of a Combat- 
ive Party' D. The Necessity for Dynamic 
Leadership, E. What Is at Stake in the 
Hutu Demands, F. The Hutu Must 
Avoid Ideological Quarrels." Again, we 
see how awareness and unity are the 
prime means to achieve the goals. 
The book is also heavily loaded with 
nationalist discourse. In the first section 
of the chapter, mentioned above, 
Gahutu reflects on the Hutu nation: 
A close examination of the situation 
in Burundi show [sic] that the Hutu 
have lost a country which was right- 
fully theirs . . . For a people to strug- 
gle, retake their country, and emerge 
victorious, their primary concern 
must be to strengthen their own iden- 
tity . . . Some Hutu . . . have changed 
their ethnic identity in order to try to 
improve their social status by reject- 
ing their own people. These turn- 
coats are only fooling themselves, 
because the Tutsi have never truly 
accepted them into their ranks. 
(Remy Gahutu, no date, 49) 
Gahutu clearly sees the struggle as a 
nationalist one. The Hutu have a coun- 
try which is rightfully theirs, only it has 
been stolen from them by someone else; 
the late comers and colonizers; the 
Tutsi. Again the taskof Palipehutu cad- 
res is to make the Hutu aware of this fact 
and of their true, authentic, identity. 
Those who deny this identity, the "turn- 
coats," arenot only traitors to the cause, 
they are also fooling themselves; they 
will never be happy, as long as they 
deny authentic identity. This idea 
of a true 'dentity, that cannot and shall 
not be attempted hidden, and of a Volk, 
that belongs to a nation, is typical of the 
kind of Blu t und Boden nationalism, as it 
was fom$ulated by the German roman- 
ticist, Hwder, in the last century. 
Duriqg the 1980s Palipehutu en- 
joyed a lot of popular support, espe- 
cially in refugee camps, being the only 
oppositiQn party of signhcance. In the 
last few years its support seems to have 
dwindled, although it is almost impos- 
sible to obtain reliable facts on the sub- 
ject.1° 
We mqy conclude that the dominant 
national &tories among Burundi refu- 
gees in camps in the 1980s coincided 
with the ideologies of Hutu parties, born 
in exile. These ideologies related to the 
feeling of despair felt by many refugees. 
They alsp related to the discursive 
power-field in Burundi where the main 
aim of theHutu opposition was toprove 
the exis-ce of an ethnic Hutu group. 
From Essentialism to 
Pragmttism? 
Many of tbe refugees in Lukole have lef t 
these ideas for ones that are less essen- 
tialist and, mostly coined in the terms of 
liberal detnocracy. The Hutu Nation is 
rarely meptioned, it is difficult to get a 
refugee W a y  to tell you the anatomic 
differencds between Hutu and Tutsi, 
and "liberation" is now replaced by 
"democracy." Before exploring the con- 
tent of thenew ideologies inLukole refu- 
gee camp, let us shortly look at some of 
the politigal developments that took 
place in vurundi between 1972 and 
1993, and how they relate to the Hutu 
oppositioq's room for manoeuvre. 
The off$ial discourse of the govern- 
ment remqbed much the same formany 
years. A 'htsi blite, mainly from the 
Hima clan and Bururi province, domi- 
nated the ovemment and the armed 
forces. Off k cially, ethnic groups still did 
not exist iq Burundi, and anyone who 
fought for H ~ t u  rights was accused of 
tribalism qnd of trying to destroy na- 
tional unity. 
Howevqr, pressure mounted-espe- 
cially from international donors-to 
reform the government, and Major 
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Pierre Buyoya-president since 1987- 
started reforms towards malti-party 
democracy. Freedom of exprdssion was 
greatly secured and there wkre many 
debates throughout the country 
(Reyntjens 1995,9). Conunittees (con- 
sisting of equal numbers of kutu and 
Tutsi) were created and copferences 
were held to debate "the qqestion of 
National Unity". Obviouslyl the gov- 
ernment was stilldeterminedtoportray 
Burundi as aunity without ethnic divi- 
sions but the realities on the dound and 
the mounting pressure front the Hutu 
opposition were forcing thk govem- 
ment to consider what it called the "di- 
verse component parts of the$urundian 
population." (Charter for National 
Unity, Article 84, quoted frodReyntjens 
1995, 9). 
Finally, in 1992 a multi-pqkty system 
was in place, and in June 1993 an over- 
whelming majority of the $opulation 
voted Frodebu (Front des mmocrates 
du Burundi) into the Natioaal Assem- 
bly and its leader, Melchior Ndadaye, a 
moderate Hutu, in as president. As we 
may recall, this bid not last 
long. With the assassinadion of the 
president a few months latek, the coun- 
try was thrown into a cama$e of killing 
once more." 
So what did these two dqcades do to 
the ~ u t u  in~urundi and to $eir ideolo- 
gies? Firstly, the 1972 massacres were a 
"watershed event" (Lemarcpland, 1996) 
for those who remained in b e  country 
as well as the refugees, and it came to 
have great impact on the* attitudes. 
During the late eighties and earlynine- 
ties Palipehutu began to o$erate inside 
Burundi. They operated clbndestinely 
and started awareness campaigns like 
in the camps. By the tiMe Buyoya 
legalized political parties, many Hutu 
were well aware of their hidtory, thanks 
to Palipehutu cadres. However, 
Palipehutu itself was newr legalized 
and most of its supporters chose to 
support the moderate Frddebu in the 
elections. Frodebu members have ex- 
pressed to me their gratimde towards 
Palipehutu for making t h m  "aware." 
Nevertheless, Frodebu differed from 
Palipehutu in many ways. Given the 
new rules of the playing fi ld in an open 
'i 
democratic atmosphere, Frodebu had to 
play by these rules, as opposed to 
Palipehutu that was used to operating 
under quite different rules. Democracy 
and human rights had become the code 
words that replaced liberation and 
unity. They were thenew nodal points, as 
Laclau would have it, around which 
chains of equivalence and antagonisms 
couldbe articulated. And after the 1993 
coup it was the restoration of democ- 
racy that became the key issue for the 
Hutu opposition and hence the Hutu in 
exile. If only democracy in the liberal 
sense of the word, understood asmulti- 
partyism, could be re-installed, every 
Hutu would be happy, and Burundi 
would again experience peace and 
prosperity for everyone. When inter- 
viewing refugees, I would often ask 
them, whether this would be enough. 
Wouldn't there still be a lot of hatred? 
But they would shrug off my doubts. 
Since the vast majority of Hutuvoted 
Frodebu in 1993 the vast majority con- 
tinued to support its successor - the 
CNDD-in exile. Thus most refugees, 
arriving in Tanzania in 1993-94-as 
opposed to the ones from 1972--already 
felt that they belonged to a party, making 
recruitment to other parties, such as 
Palipehutu, more difficult. CNDD was 
created by Leonard Nyangoma and 
other Frodebu members who found that 
the remaining Frodebu leadership was 
giving too many concessions to the 
small but active and increasingly radi- 
cal Tutsi opp~sit ion.~~ 
The attitude towards the Tutsi be- 
comes more ambiguous in this dis- 
course. Whereas the Palipehutu 
supporters in Mishamo had no doubt 
about the malignity of the Tutsi, nor 
about their "racial" differences, both 
physically and mentally (cf. Malkki 
1995,78-80), the refugees inLukole are 
more ambivalent. 
Most CNDD members in Lukole 
would go to great lengths to explain that 
there are no differences between Hutu 
and Tutsi. However, this discourse on 
Hutu-Tutsi relations was often contra- 
dictory. For although there is no differ- 
ence between a Hutu and a Tutsi, you 
canalways tellthe difference after some 
days on their behaviour . Similarly, they 
would explain that there are no physi- 
cal differences, not because there are no 
specific Hutu or Tutsi traits,butbecause 
you get Hutu with Tutsi traits and vice 
versa. Once I let some educated friends 
in the camp, who had explained that 
there are no differences in appearance, 
look through abook of mine on Burundi 
history. Then suddenly one said to the 
other "Tutsi kabisa [a real Tutsi]" and 
pointed to a photo (I think of Prince 
Rwagasore), and they bothlaughed and 
pointed. When I asked what the fuss 
was about, they answered that he 
looked so obviously like a Tutsi, al- 
though they could not explain how. 
Similarly, the interpretation of his- 
tory becomes more ambivalent. There 
seems generally to be less of an obses- 
sion with ancient history. When1 would 
ask refugees when the problems be- 
tweenHutu and Tutsi arose, the answer 
often would be; at independence, in 
1965 whenthe first Hutuprimeminister 
was killed, or in 1972. So, officially at 
least, they actually adhere to the same 
national history as the Burundi regime; 
namely that Hutu and Tutsi lived in 
harmony until they were colonized by 
the Belgians. 
This ambivalence may date back to 
the time of democratic reforms. The gov- 
ernment itself no longer stuck vehe- 
mently to the idea that no ethnic groups 
existed. It had admitted to the idea of 
"component parts." Nevertheless, po- 
litical parties were strictly not allowed 
to use ethnicity in their programs. This 
ambiguous stance onbehalf of the gov- 
ernment was reflected in the opposition. 
On the one hand the whole struggle had 
been for the rights of the Hutu. On the 
other hand Frodebu was very careful to 
avoid being seen as an ethnic party, 
knowing very well that the governing 
Uprona party would seize the opportu- 
nity to accuse Frodebu of being tribalist. 
Another reason for the most of the 
refugees in Lukole to seem less essen- 
tialist has to do with their acute aware- 
ness of the global community.13 
Refugees in Lukole would hear BBC, 
VOA, RPI and South African radio as 
well as Tanzanian, Burundian and 
Rwandan radio, and if they did not have 
a receiver or could not understand Eng- 
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 lish, French or Swahili, they would get the 
news from others. Hence they all know 
what the international community is 
preaching in Africa (democracy and human 
rights) and they know what the 
international community says about the 
events in Rwanda in 1994. 
As most scholars on the Great Lakes 
region have commented, one cannot fully 
understand the dynamics of Burundi 
without knowing the dynamics of Rwanda 
and vice versa. The same goes for 
understanding the politics of Hutu 
opposition in Burundi now. They are aware 
that to avoid international opinion against 
them, they must avoid being associated 
with the Hutu genocidaires from Rwanda. 
Therefore CNDD members are very careful 
not to mention anything that might sound 
like Hutu supremacism. In the introduction 
to his book Burundi; The Origins of 
the Hutu- Tutsi Conflict, Leonce 
Ndarubagiye,a TutsimemberofCNDD, 
exiled in Nairobi, warns against comparing 
"the situations of Rwanda and Burundi 
solely on ethnic terms... the policy of Hutu 
of Burundi has nothing to do with that of 
Rwandese Hutu" (Ndarubagiye 1996, xiii). 
From this we may conclude that the 
shift in the dominant discourse in Burundi, 
involving democratic reforms and a partial 
accept of ethnicity, changed the political 
playing field, forcing the Hutu opposition 
to change its ideology and reformulate its 
resistance around issues of democracy and 
human rights. Another reason for aban-
doning essentialist and ethnicist cat 
egories can be found in the fear among 
Burundian Hutu of being compared with 
the genocidaires of Rwanda. 
Politics and History in Lukole 
Exploring politics in the refugee camp is a 
daunting task. Political activity is strictly 
not allowed by the Tanzanian Ministry of 
Home Affairs (MHA) as this might 
jeopardize the already strained relations 
between Tanzania and Burundi. After 
being in the camp for some time, people 
did, however, open up to me and tell 
something-albeit not all-of what was going 
on. 
It is generally held that the refugees 
who fled immediately after Ndadaye's 
assassination, were often either educated 
or held some political office as Frodebu 
members (among them a few 
burgomasters). They fled because they 
felt personally threatened. Other refugees 
arrived in 1995, fleeing from fighting 
between rebels and government troops in 
Giteranyi Commune just across the 
boarder. They were usually uneducated 
peasants fleeing en masse from the 
fighting. They were originally kept in a 
different refugee camp and were moved 
to Lukole in early 1997. 
It is widely agreed among the refugees 
that the 1993-94 refugees are 
overwhelmingly Frodebistes / CNDD 
supporters, while Palipehutu still enjoys 
some support among the later arrivals. It 
is difficult to estimate how much this is 
true and how much it is rumours, as all 
political activity is clandestine. Equally 
there are many local theories as to why 
this is so. From my observations, 
however, there seems to be a correlation 
between time of arrival and political 
alliance. The Frodebu leaders that fled in 
1993-94 naturally took their political 
ideas with them and consolidated their 
power in Lukole-often becoming street 
leaders, NGO employees, or security 
guardians. The later arrivals had 
experienced a climate of ethnic 
radicalization in Burundi from 1993 until 
they fled in 1995-96. They were 
thus more "available" to radical poli 
tics. Furthermore, as far as I have been 
able to gather, the rebels fighting in their 
commune were Palipehutu. And as they 
were put in a separate camp at first, the 
established leadership in Lukole could not 
manage to rein them in time. 
Finally, letus remember that not eve-
rything in the camp is related to politics, 
nor is everyone interested in politics. 
Neither are they very interested in the 
history of their country. There are other 
ways of coping in exile; other strategies to 
feel a sense of meaning in life. Young men 
especially will spend all their time and 
energy trying to accumulate a little extra 
money by running all sorts of bus iness; 
from bicycle taxis to trading in USAID 
maize rations and running bars and video 
halls.14 This strategy is 
focussed on the present and their own 
immediate benefits for themselves and their 
families in the camp. National history does 
not interest them much, and politics will 
just get you into trouble. Thus we find a 
dichotomy between those refugees who try 
to understand the past and change the 
future of the Hutu people as a whole, and 
those who invest in the present and their 
immediate family. 15 
Conclusion 
This paper has attempted to explain how 
different versions of the past are generated 
and become sometimes "the" legitimate 
version in certain contexts. The reason for 
going into this was the discovery of totally 
different versions of history among 
Burundian Hutu in Lukole refugee camp. 
There is no doubt that the social con-
ditions of the refugees in exile playa big 
role in shaping their understanding of 
national history. As Malkki pointed out, 
there was an abysmal difference between 
the refugees living in Mishamo refugee 
camp and those living in Kigoma town, 
when it came to their understanding of and 
interest in their common past. Similarly 
there are differences between most of the 
refugees in Lukole in the late 1990s and the 
refugees in Mishamo in the 1980s. 
As Malkki so rightly notes, the mythico-
history is a cosmology. It helps explain to 
the refugees why they are where they are. 
But this process of creating a national 
history and hence a nation is no innocent 
game. It takes place in a complicated 
power field and inserts itself and asserts 
itself in that field. Therefore this paper has 
attempted to analyze this power field. We 
have seen how the hegemonic discourse in 
Burundi-partially due to global changes 
and partially due to resistance within the 
country-had to shift in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. This shift in the hegemonic 
discourse resulted in a shift in the 
possibilities of resistance. Resistance had 
to be formulated around other issues, 
other nodal points. Consequently, the main 
opposition Hutu party of the 1990s, 
Frodebu, has a some 
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what different ideology to the main 
party of the 1980s, Palipehutp. 
Whereas Palipehutu emphpsizes lib- 
eration, nationalism, and Hqtu unity, 
Frodebu emphasizes human qights and 
democracy. Apart from these differ- 
ences, Palipehutu is more preoccupied 
withhistory. Its supporters share a cos- 
mology that is "at once comp#ling and 
frightening" (Malkki 1995,2$8). 
Not many refugees inLukqle seem to 
know of these mythic0 histoties. Their 
version of national history is pragmatic 
and in many ways contradqtory and 
flawed. The reasons for cont$adictions 
couldbe due to the essence of pragmatic 
histories; they are not fully fledged, co- 
herent cosmologies. There co@d alsobe 
contradictions because of thp inherent 
contradictions in the politic4 ideology 
of Frodebu. 
In Lukole both ~rodebu and 
Palipehutuhave supporters and alleg- 
edly Frodebu is much bi ger than 
Palipehutu. The question !t whether 
Frodebu's pragmatic version of na- 
tional history will remain do-t. As 
we saw, the historical cha&es in the 
power fieldinBurundiprovqd advanta- 
geous for Frodebu, and it wps difficult 
for Palipehutu to spread its jdeology in 
the camp. But can a pragmqtic history 
survive in a refugee camp fo lon if it is f g 
up against a beautiful and dangerous 
mythico-history; a history fiat appeals 
through its clarity and sdngth? Will 
the radicalization of politics inside 
Burundi not call for more ~adical na- 
tional myths in the refugee camps as 
well? Will the strength of t$e Frodebu 
leadership and the physicql setting of 
the camp, with its abundance of traders, 
be able to keep Palipehutu at bay? Or 
willFrodebuitself start sliding towards 
a more essentialist, ethnicigt ideology? 
The future of national histories in 
Lukole is in no ways certaip. 
On a more general level, this paper 
has shed light on how the pplitical field 
greatly influences which l&tories and 
cosmologies refugees believe in, and 
how objective life conditiohs in or out- 
side of camps certainly influence but 
cannot explain the emergence of spe- 
cific ideologies. Finally, while refugees 
certainly are constrained and condi- 
tioned by life in camps, we must not 
presume that they are isolated from the 
outside world; the changing relations of 
power in their country of origin, re- 
gional geopolitical developments, and 
global trends are all monitored and in- 
terpreted by people living in refugee 
camps. All this information is proc- 
essed into rumours and myths and in- 
terpreted according to the available 
ideologies in the camp. During thisproc- 
ess some ideologies may have to change 
or give way to others, as has hap- 
pened-and is constantly happen- 
ing-among Burundian refugees in 
Tanzania. 
Notes 
1. This paper is based on a year's field work 
in Lukole, a camp for Burundian refugees 
in Tanzania, and makes up a small part of 
a research project with the primary objec- 
tive of exploring how young men adapt to 
life in a refugee camp. 
2. The right to tell the history of Burundi or to 
have any political opinion is virtually re- 
served for men. 
3. This conflict over the true nature of the 
conflict in Burundi has also spread to the 
academic world, making it v G  difficult to 
manoeuvre withoutbeing accused ofbeing 
pro-Hutu or pro-Tutsi. This is what  ens 
Lemarchand has termed "the meta-con- 
flict" &emarchand 1996,17-33). 
4. Without going into too much detail here, 
my understanding of the relation is in- 
spired by Slavoj Zizek (Zizek 1989) and 
Emesto Laclau (Laclau 1994) and their 
reading of Lacan in political analysis. 
5. In Lacanian terms, ideologies promise to 
suture the rift that prevent sthe community 
from being what it ought to be. 
6. Similar obedience to the leaders has been 
attributed a significant role in organizing 
the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 (Cf. 
Prunier 1995). 
7. We encounter a similar debate on the "in- 
timidators" in the camps for Rwandan 
refugees in Tanzania and Zaire. If we ac- 
cept that "civilian" refugees actually be- 
lieved that theTutsi would kill them upon 
return, the issue of intimidators becomes 
irrelevant. Such people donotneedintimi- 
dating. 
8. This information is based on interviews 
with refugees in Lukole, some of whom 
had lived inMishamo and Ulyankulu, and 
withEtienne Karatase, (former?) leader of 
Palipehutu. 
9. Of course, politics should 
broader terms than party 
ever, for the simplicity of th 
have chosen to focusonparty 
camps. This choice is also due to thd- . 
whelming presence of partypoliticsfotmd 
in the camp. 
10. All parties claim much larger support than 
they have, and like to take the honour for 
any rebel activity in Burundi. However, 
even Palipehutu supporters do talk of the 
problems that they now face compared 
with the "good old days" of Remy Gahutu. 
11. For competent analyses of what Reyntjens 
has termed "the most successful aborted 
coup in history" (Reyntjens 1995,116) see 
Lemarchand (1996) and Reyntjens [1995). 
12. InMay 1998asplitoccurredinCNDR)with 
the former chief-of-staff JeantBosco 
Ndayikengurukiye claiming tobe thenew 
leader and becoming the leader of krhat is 
now known as CNDD-FDD. 
13. There is no doubt that my being conceived 
of as a part of international opiniOn, or at 
least a link to the international community, 
biased the stories that were presented to 
me. However, it is still interesting to note 
that they knew in which way tocensor the 
information that was given to me, i.e., to 
leave out essentialist, ethnicist opidonand 
replace it with the rhetoric of denmcracy 
and human rights. 
14. I discuss the changing roles of young men 
in thecampsin Angry YoungMen in Camps: 
Losses and New Opportunities (forthcom- 
ing). 
15. This is reflected in their attitudes towards 
education. The politicized elite will often 
see education not only as a way of aug- 
menting ones chances in life. 1t is 
also an investment in the future of the Hutu 
people. Traders, on the other hand, will 
dismiss this and (rightly) claim that edu- 
cated Hutu always are the first to be de- 
capitated in Burundi. 
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